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Abstract—This article revision the literature related to Vehicular Delay Tolerant Network 
with focus on Cooperation. It starts by examining definitions of some of the fields of research 
in VDTN on security policies. An overview of VDTN on security policies  cooperative 
networks is presented. A security policy is a high-level specification of the security properties 
that a given system should possess. It is a means for designers domain experts and 
implementers to communicate with each other, and a blueprint that drives a project from 
design through implementation and validation. We offer a survey of the most significant 
security policy models in the literature showing security may mean very different things in 
different contexts and we review some of the mechanisms used to implement a gievn security 
policy. 
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Introduction 
This survey will present security policies and mechanisms on cooperation for Vehicular 
Delay Torlant Network.Security policy is a high level specification of the security policies. 
Security management is the ability to control access to the system and its services, while 
protecting the privacy of its legal users. 
Many Organisations use the security policy to mean a colletion of content free statement.A 
security policy model is a succinct statement of the protection properties that a system, or 
generic type of system, must have. Its key points can typically be written down in a page or 
less. It is the document in which the protection goals of the system are agreed with an entire 
community, or with the top management of a customer. It may also be the basis of formal 
mathematical analysis. 
In computer security, as in most branches of engineering, we learn more from the systems 
that fail than from those that succeed. MLS systems have been an e_ective teacher in this 
regard; the large expended in building systems to follow a simple policy with a high level of 
assurance 
has led to the elucidation of many second- and third-order consequences of information flow 
controls. 
 
Vehicular networks are promising in providing Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) and Vehicle-
to-Vehicle (V2V) communication, thus allowing for many useful services on roads related to 
safety applications as well as entertainment applications. However, a number of constraints 
can impact the reliability of vehicular networks applications. The general constraints concern 
the high mobility, dynamic environment, security of communication, 
and routing scalability. On the other hand, cooperation is vital and beneficial for services 
deployment in vehicular networks. We can imagine that cooperation in vehicular networks 
could be either implicit or explicit. The former concerns the efficiency of the MAC layer 
protocols in order to allow reliable multi-hop transfer between the nodes, and the efficient 
security mechanisms (mainly authentication and access control) that could allow the different 
vehicles (nodes) to communicate in a trusted manner and hence cooperate in relaying each 
others packets.[5]. 
 
What is security policy 
Security engineering is about building system to remain dependable in the face of malice as 
well as error and mischance. As a discipline, it focuses on the tools, processes and methods 
needed to design, implement and test complete systems, and to adapt existing systems as their 
environment.[1] 
 
Security and privacy are important to the wide deployments of delay tolerant networks. 
Without security and privacy guarantees, people are reluctant to accept such a new network 
paradigm. To address the security and privacy issues in delay tolerant networks, in this paper, 
based on ID-based ring signatures and Merkle hash tree techniques, we present a new 
efficient anonymous authentication mechanism. The newly proposed mechanism not only 
achieves good security properties, including authentication, anonymity and confidentiality, 





As we have seen, security policies started primarily as coherent sets of constraints describing 
who could access what, and when. Even if our last few examples have shown more general 
scenarios, controlling access to resources tends to be the primary goal of many security 
policy models. It must be noted that pure access control is not the best mechanism when the 
policy requires state to be retained. 
 
A delay tolerant network (DTN) is a store and forward network where end-to-end 
connectivity 
is not assumed and where opportunistic links between nodes are used to transfer data. 
Security Attacks of Vehicular Networks. The application of vehicular ad hoc network 
(VANET) improves driving safety and traffic management. Due to the above applications, 
security attacks on VANET can be serious threats all the time. VANET is a special form of 
mobile ad hoc network (MANET). Hence any attacks exist on MANET also can be arisen on 
VANET. Moreover, some special attacks can be raised on VANET, which do not exist on 
MANET. Nevertheless, some characteristics of VANET can be positive effects and some can 
be negative effects on security issues. Before designing the security mechanism to defend 
attacks, the authors should take the positive effects and avoid the negative effects on the 
security of VANET. Furthermore, the authors class all possible attacks of VANET from 
every network layer. They also introduce the reason of forming every attack and the possible 
effect on VANET in detail. Therefore this chapter helps understanding the latent threats and 
the useful resources of security issues on VANET.[3] 
 
Security and privacy Mechanisms for Vehicular Networks 
Security and Autentication versus Cooperation 
Cooperation between nodes in vehicular networks should be guaranteed in order to assure the 
correct service provision. Although cooperation in vehicular networks is important and 
beneficial to allow service access in a multihop distributed fashion, it could penalize the 
service access and the whole communication if malicious nodes could be involved in the 
communication. To assure secure and hence reliable cooperation, it should be ensured that 
only authorized users are granted network’ s access. There are two main types of attacks 
could exist in vehicular networks and could allow non-cooperative behavior in such 
Environment i) external attacks, where the attackers do not involve in the network, however 
they could carry out some attacks and malicious acts impacting the communication and the 
network and services performance, and ii) 
internal attacks, where the attackers involve in the network and have legitimate service 
access, however they penalize the network performance through malicious and non 
cooperative acts. Consequently, efficient counter measures against these attacks need to be 
employed in order to ensure secure and reliable cooperation in vehicular 
networks. These counter-measures includes authentication and access control that are vital 
counter-attack measures in vehicular networks deployments, allowing only authorized users 
to have connectivity. Although Authentication and access control can reinforce cooperation 
through prevention against external attackers, internal attackers could always exist even in 
the presence of effective authentication and access control mechanisms. Internal attackers are 
nodes that are authenticated and authorized to participate in the network; however, they can 
be harmful 
nodes causing network and service performance degradation mainly through non cooperative 
behaviors (selfishness, greediness, and Denial-of-Services or DoS). Hence, there is a need for 





In general, we look to secure  the operation of vehicular coomunication system to design 
protocols that mitigate attacks and thwart deviations from the implemented protocols to the 
greatest possible extent. 
 
Message autentication and integrity mechanisms protect messages from alteration and allow 
receivers to corroborate the node that creted the messages. If necessary, entity autentication 
can provide the evidance of the sender liveness.(that sender generated message recenetly).To 
prevent a sender from denying having sent a message non repudiation is needed. Access 
control and Authorization can detemine what each node is allowed to do in the network.in 
terms of implemented system functionality. Confidentaility can keep message content secret 
from unauthorized nodes. 
 
Privacy and anonymity  are required at least level of protection is achieved before the advent 
of VC system.In general VC systems should not allow disclousre of private user information. 
In particuler the identity of vehicular performing a VC specific action should be concealed. 
Anonmity with respect to an obserever. Depend on the set of involved vehiculers. An 
observer can’t determine among all vehicules in the set which vehicular performed an action. 
Moreover, any two actions by the same vehicule cannot be linked. But uder specific 
circumstances an observer could consider a vehicule more likely to perform an action.[4] 
 
Secure Communication 
The basic way for nodes to undertake secure communication is for them to sign messages 
digitally,after attaching a time stamp and signer’s location and certificate to the message. 
This way alteration replay, and relay attacks can be defeated. 
 
Reducing the cost of security and privacy enhancing mechanism 
Mechanisms have been proposed in the literatcure  to reduce overhead and enhance 
robustness.  
Mechanism1 
At the sender side, the Cert Kv is computed only once Kv. Becasue CertKv remains 
unchanged throughout the puedo life time t. Note that notation here does n’t distinguish 
which  method  
is used for the certificate generation. For the same reason at the verifier side the Cert Kv is 
validated upon the first reception and stored even though the sender appends it multiple 
messages. For all subsequent receptions, if the Cert Kv has already seen. The verifier skips its 
validation. This optimization is useful because t >>r-1 
Mechanism2 
The sender appends its signature to all messages. But it appends the corresponding 
KvCert.only once every message. 
Mechanism 2 can affect the protocol robustness. If the message carries Kv and Cert ca Ki+1  
is not received.  Then nodes in range V must wait for a messages before the pseudosym 
transmission while being unable to validate any message from V.This can be dangerous if 
vehicules are close to each other and moving at high relative speeds. 
Mechanism3 
To address the forementioned issue with mechanisms 2 
The transmission of Kv i+1 Cert Kv i+1 is repeated for Bconsective messages when Kvi+1.is 
issued with B denoted as the puch period. Rather than distributing RLs of other regions. The 




A security policy is a specification of the protection goals of a system. Many expansive 
failures are due to understand what the system security policy should have been. 
Technological protection mechanisms such as cryptography and smartcards may be more 
glamorous for the implementer, but technology-driven designs have a nasty habit of 
protecting the wrong things. At the highest level of abstraction, a security policy model has 
little if any reference to the mechanisms that will be used to implement it. At the next level 
down, a protection sets out what a given type of system or component should protect, without 
going into implementation detail, and relates the protection mechanisms to threats and 
evironmental assumptions. A security target gives a precise statement of what a given system 
or component will protect and how [6]. Especially at the highest levels the policy functions as 
a means of communication. it is a contract between the implementer and the client | 
something that both understand and by which both agree to be bound [7]. Security and 
anonymity are critical in many DTN implementations. Due to the unique disconnected nature 
of DTNs, traditional security solutions based on public key infrastructure are not suitable for 
these emerging networks [8]. 
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